Much of the literature on labor supply responsiveness to taxes studies the effects of payroll and income taxes together, usually using income tax changes to identify effects. There is less research on how individuals respond to payroll taxes specifically. Given the salience of the payroll tax relative to other income taxes, it is possible that taxpayers respond differentially than income tax elasticities may suggest. Using data from the Social Security Administration, I exploit two recent short-term changes in payroll taxes to study whether labor earnings responded. The Making Work Pay Tax Credit reduced the payroll tax by 6.2 percentage points up to $6,451 ($12,903 for couples) of earnings in 2009 and 2010. I test for bunching at this kink. In 2011, payroll taxes were reduced by 2 percentage points, changing the incentives to bunch at the taxable earnings maximum. While many papers on bunching must make assumptions on the distribution of earnings in the absence of taxes, an advantage of studying changes in payroll taxes is that it is possible to observe the distribution in different years under different tax regimes. I find evidence of bunching induced by the payroll tax changes. I estimate a tax elasticity of labor earnings of 0.08 at the taxable earnings maximum, suggests that policy proposals to raise or eliminate the payroll tax cap should consider labor supply behavioral responses to this policy. I also estimate larger responsiveness to the Making Work Pay Tax Credit, though this estimate is primarily driven by people with self-employment earnings.
Introduction
Payroll taxes in the United States are a major source of government revenue and the primary mechanism of tax payments on labor earnings for the majority of households. Payroll taxes comprise over half of taxes on labor earnings in the United States (OECD (2015) ). Over 65% of households pay more in payroll taxes than income taxes in a year (Joint Committee on Taxation (2015)). The ratio between payroll tax payments and income tax payments is especially large for low-income households and tends to decrease throughout the earnings 1 However, we have relatively little evidence about behavioral response to eliminating the cap.
A rich and influential literature estimates the elasticity of taxable income (e.g., Auten and Carroll (1999) ; Gruber and Saez (2002) ; Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2012) ). These papers use legislative tax schedule changes for identification. During the time periods used in this literature, these tax changes tend to be primarily related to income taxes, not payroll taxes. Furthermore, the literature models taxable income responsiveness as a function of taxes, aggregating together payroll and income taxes. There are reasons that people may respond to payroll taxes differently than income taxes. First, labor earnings may be more or less sensitive to taxes than other sources of income. Second, payroll taxes are more salient than income taxes, and this salience may influence the degree of household responsiveness.
Understanding the importance of payroll taxes independent of income taxes is especially policy-relevant given that the degree to which taxes are collected through income taxes versus payroll taxes is a possible policy lever.
A smaller literature focuses on the consequences of payroll taxes. Saez, Matsaganis and Tsakloglou (2012) studies a payroll tax change in Greece in 1993. Lehmann, Marical and Rioux (2013) compares payroll tax responsiveness to income tax responsiveness in [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] France. Kugler and Kugler (2009) studies the incidence of a payroll tax increase in Colombia while Gruber (1997) examines similar outcomes in Chile.
Liebman and Saez (2006) uses behavioral responses to income tax changes to predict sensitivity to payroll tax changes in the United States. This paper also studies the earnings distribution around the taxable earnings maximum and finds little evidence of systematic avoidance of the kink. This result contrasts with my findings below as I estimate that when the Social Security tax rate changed that the distribution of earnings around the taxable maximum changed. The differences in these conclusions provides support for the benefit of using policy changes to study behavioral responses in this context rather than studying cross-sectional variation in the earnings density.
This paper is the first to study labor supply responsiveness to payroll taxes in the United States. I estimate "bunching" near kinks generated by recent payroll tax credits.
I also study the consequences of the payroll tax rate reduction on changes in the earning density at the kink generated by the taxable earnings maximum since the tax cut altered the incentives to locate near the kink in the budget constraint. Methodologically, the contribution of this paper is to use policy changes to study behavior around kink points. The bunching literature must assume that the distribution of earnings is constant within a small window around kinks or changes smoothly in a manner that can be modeled parametrically.
In this paper, I permit arbitrary density changes throughout the earnings distribution and test whether there are discrete changes corresponding to policy reforms.
This strategy builds on a rich literature which develops econometric methods in the presence of nonlinear budget sets (Burtless and Hausman (1978); Hausman (1981 Hausman ( , 1985 ), including strategies which test predictions of bunching at convex kink points. Studying bunching has been used in an array of other applications such as responsiveness to a large kink in the Swedish tax schedule (Bastani and Selin (2014) ), sensitivity to kinks in the Denmark tax schedule (Chetty et al. (2011)), and the relationship between kinks generated by pension reforms and retirement decisions (Brown (2013) The MWPTC was phased out at a rate of 2% for incomes about $75,000 ($150,000
for married couples). This phaseout was based on all taxable income, which I do not observe in the data. Consequently, I will not study the effects of the kink generated by the phaseout. 
Theoretical Concepts
This paper studies changes in nonlinear budgets, including the introduction of convexities to the budget constraint and a slope change around a non-convexity in the budget constraint. close to the kink. Consequently, there are households that react to the kink by reducing their labor supply. In this paper, I study a kink caused by a tax rate reduction below the created kink. The conclusions about the relative earnings density remain the same, however.
Households are more likely to locate around than the kink than they would in a tax regime without the kink.
In the right panel of Figure 1 , I show a non-convex budget constraint. If the tax rate were linear at the same rate as below the kink, the household would locate at point B. The tax rate reduction above the kink, however, induces the household to (possibly) relocate to a higher level of pre-tax earnings at point A. In Figure 1 , the household is indifferent between the two points but may still increase earnings. The reform studied in this paper at this part of the earnings distribution decreased the tax rate below the kink. This alters the degree of the non-convexity. The non-convexity encourages households to not locate close to the kink as those points are likely dominated by points above the kink. Thus, a non-convex kink should lead to "spreading," not bunching. However, when the budget constraint becomes less non-convex, more household should locate near the kink. Consequently, I expect to observe an increased density near the taxable earnings maximum in 2011. In a relative sense, this will look like bunching.
Data
Isolating "bunching" is difficult when earnings are reported with error. Even classical measurement error will lead to significant bias since we will not observe as much bunching as we should. Consequently, it is important to use administrative data. In this paper, I use the Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) 1% sample. This data set is longitudinal and contains information on labor earnings, Social Security benefits, year of birth, and several other administrative variables. I focus on a few key variables. First, I use "Medicare Taxable Earnings," which has the advantage that it is not topcoded. This property is important when I study behavior around the taxable maximum kink. I also use information about selfemployment earnings to select on people with self-employment earnings, given that previous research has found that individuals with self-employment income are the primary responders to taxes. The CWHS merges together data from several sources. The earnings data come from the Master Earnings File and comprises IRS tax data. Thus, the observed earnings for each person is the exact amount observed from the IRS, the administrative variable which determines the magnitude of the tax credits studied in this paper. Unfortunately, the CWHS does not contain marital status so it is not possible to know which MWPTC maximum that the individual would have responded to (nor do I know spousal earnings to construct total household labor earnings). This will attenuate the effect that I estimate. I created "bins" based on total individual annual earnings. These bins are $400 in size and centered around each kink. For example, the first MWPTC kink is at $6,451 so I create a bin which includes all individuals with earnings greater than $6,051 and less than or equal to $6,451. I do this for each kink such that bins marked as "$0" relative to the bin consist of people with earnings greater than $400 less than kink up to earnings exactly at the kink.
Empirical Strategy
The bunching literature typically assumes that the earnings density, in the absence of kinks, is locally constant or smooth. This assumption is difficult to test. The main advantage of using payroll tax changes is that it permits the use of panel data to account for the underlying (fixed) earnings distribution, which may or may not be smooth around the kinks. Using the CWHS, I create bins or cells based on earnings relative to each kink and count the number of people in each bin. That is the outcome variable that I will model. I study the earnings distribution in each year relative to the kink. My primary specification is
where S ct is the number of people in cell (or bin) c in year t. I estimate this specification separately for each MWPTC kink. Each sample includes all bins within $6,000 of the kink.
The specification includes bin fixed effects to account for the fixed underlying earnings distribution around the kink. The time fixed effects account for changes in the size of the total number of people within $6,000 of the kink. f t (c) is a function which varies by year, permit-ting the earnings distribution to change for reasons other than the tax rate changes. This function must be parametric and I use a quadratic functional form for most the analysis.
The results are not sensitive to this choice.
I study the effects of each MWPTC kink on the earnings density within δ = $800 of the kink. Theory suggests that we should observe a higher fraction of individuals near the kink, suggesting that β 1 and/or β 2 should be positive. I allow the effect to differ based on whether the bin is below or above the kink. I disaggregate the effects for directly below and directly above the kink because individuals may have optimization error and not locate precisely at the kink. Disaggregating the effects allows for estimation of bunching even in the presence of optimization error while permitting some flexibility.
The tax holiday specification is similar. However, it allows a change in the earnings density around the kink in 2011, using 2009 and 2010 as controls. Equation (2) models the density as an exponential function. It is common in applied work to use a log-linear specification, but Silva and Tenreyro (2006) shows that an exponential functional form relaxes some restrictions imposed by a log-linear specification. They recommend estimation using
Poisson regression. Recent work has shown that Poisson regression with two sets of fixed effects does not suffer from an incidental parameters problem (Fernández-Val and Weidner (2014) ). I will also provide log-linear estimates. The conclusions do not substantially differ across the different estimation methods.
To derive elasticities similar to the method applied in Saez (2010), I estimate
is the ratio of the payroll net-of-tax rate at the kink. τ 0 represents the rate below the kink and τ 1 represents the rate above the kink. This variable is set equal to 0 for most bins.
It is only non-zero for cells close to the kink. ϕ is not the elasticity of interest but must be appropriately scaled by the earnings level at the kink divided by the number of households at the kink (I use the average number in the "untreated" years for the number of households).
I estimate specifications (2) and (3) for three groups: all taxpayers; taxpayers with no selfemployment income; and taxpayers with positive self-employment earnings.
An advantage of using policy changes to study bunching is that I can account for bunching that is not caused by the policy itself. This bunching may occur because of underlying factors determining the labor earnings distribution or due to other policies, such as the EITC. In fact, we can observe bunching due to the EITC in our data. Saez (2010) finds that taxpayers reporting self-employment income bunch at the minimum income necessary to receive the full credit. Table 1 lists this income level by year and number of children. It stays relatively constant over this time period such that bin fixed effects should account for bunching in the earnings density due to the EITC. Cross-sectional analysis would struggle to model such discrete jumps not caused directly by the reform of interest. Second, there is evidence of increased bunching due to the MWPTC.
Results

Graphical Evidence
Relative to the EITC, this bunching is small but that is to be expected due to the temporary nature of the MWPTC and the small size of the credit when compared to the EITC credit rate. In Figure 4 , I show the densities around the Social Security taxable earnings maximum. Given that the maximum creates a non-convexity in the budget constraint, we should observe "spreading" around this kink. However, the payroll tax holiday made the tax rate change at the maximum less pronounced such that we should observe less spreading. Con- 
Regression Estimates
In Table 2 , I present regression estimates of equations (2) and (3). I estimate these equations for all taxpayers within $6,000 of the kink. I also estimate separately by self-employment status. The first parameter is the relative change in the density in the $800 below the kink, and the second parameter refers to the change in the density for the $800 above the kink.
I include the results of a joint hypothesis test where the null hypothesis is that both of these parameters are equal to 0. I also present the results of a hypothesis test for the null hypothesis that the sum of the two parameters is equal to 0. In the last row, I present the elasticity estimated generated by estimation of equation (3).
There is little evidence of increased bunching at this kink for the full sample and for the sample without any self-employment earnings. However, the estimates do imply bunching for individuals with self-employment income, consistent with the graphical evidence in Figure   2 . The parameter on the "Above Kink" variable implies that the MWPTC increased the number of people with income above the kink but less than $800 from the kink by almost 7%.
The implied tax elasticity is 0.716, though this is not statistically significant from 0.
Because the MWPTC was implemented in the middle of 2009, we may expect different responsiveness in 2009 and 2010. Table 3 presents separate estimates by year. These estimates are jointly estimated, but the effect of the MWPTC is allowed to vary by year. Focusing on the self-employment group, there is some evidence that the estimates are larger in magnitude in 2009, though these differences are small. In general, the estimates are generally consistent across the two years. Table 4 presents the estimates for the married couples kink generated by the MW-PTC. Again, there is little evidence that people without self-employment earnings respond to payroll tax changes. However, I estimate a large response by individuals with selfemployment income. Both below and above the kink, the densities increase in the MW-PTC years. The implied elasticity is 1.6. In Table 5 , I disaggregate this effect by year.
Consistent with the hypothesis that there should be a larger effect in 2010, I estimate more responsiveness to the MWPTC in 2010. The implied elasticity for 2009 is over 1.3, while the estimated elasticity for 2010 is over 1.8. Both estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level, but the confidence intervals are also rather large and I cannot rule out much smaller elasticities.
Behavior at the taxable earnings maximum is especially policy-relevant as it is indicative of how changes to the maximum or elimination of the maximum would impact labor supply. For these estimates, I only use the 2009-2011 data. 5 Table 6 presents estimates about behavioral responses at this kink to changes in the payroll tax at earnings below the maximum. The estimates imply that individuals are very responsive at the taxable earnings maximum. While bunching around the non-convex kink is -in principle -not optimal, the payroll tax holiday reduced the degree of this non-convexity and induced bunching relative to baseline. The estimates imply that the payroll tax holiday increased the number of individuals with earnings below the maximum but within $800 by over 6%. The implied elasticity is 0.08. Unlike the MWPTC results, individuals with no self-employment income are driving this result. In fact, I do no estimate any statistically significant effect for individuals with self-employment income. This is partially due to the parameterization that I have used in 5 Including 2008 has little effect on the estimates.
terms of how I define "near" the kink. As discussed earlier, Figure 4 suggests an increase in the earnings density at a higher level of earnings. However, the number of individuals with self-employment income around the kink is relatively small so noise is also a contributing factor. This last result suggests that understanding the ramifications of raising or eliminating the payroll tax cap must consider the subsequent labor supply responses to this policy change.
Robustness of Estimates
In Table 7 , I replicate previous results using a log-linear functional form, estimated by OLS.
The results are very similar to the Poisson estimates. While Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argues that Poisson estimation imposes fewer assumptions than its log-linear counterpart, I
find little evidence of bias here. The main conclusions of this paper remain the same even when OLS estimation is employed.
For the main estimates, I construct bins within $6,000 of each kink. In principle, the estimates in this paper should be less sensitive to the range of earnings included in the analysis relative to those found using only cross-sectional earnings density estimation.
The bin fixed effects non-parametrically account for the underlying earnings density. The specification even permits some parametric changes in the density in each year by including a quadratic term as a function of the bins. Table 8 studies whether the choice of the sample is driving the estimates more explicitly. I limit the sample to earnings within $4,400 of the kink in Table 8 and replicate my previous estimates. The estimates are generally similar, suggesting that the bin fixed effects and the quadratic function f t (c) are adequate in terms of modeling the underling earnings distribution around the kinks.
Discussion and Conclusion
Payroll tax reform represents a possible solution to extending the solvency of Medicare and Social Security. While we have many estimates of responsiveness to income taxes in the United States, there is less evidence concerning sensitivity to payroll taxes specifically. I find evidence that payroll tax changes do impact labor supply behavior. The MWPTC created bunching at kinks, primarily among those with self-employed income. This is potentially a function of reporting behavior and not true labor supply changes. The payroll tax holiday changed behavior at the taxable earnings maximum. I estimate an elasticity of about 0.08, primarily driven by people with no self-employment income. This elasticity is modest relative to the tax literature which has often found estimates in the range of 0.1 to 0.4. Moreover, the elasticity of taxable income literature typically shows that high-income taxpayers are more responsive to income taxes relative to low-income taxpayers, suggesting additional caution in raising or eliminating the payroll tax cap. My estimates imply a more modest response.
However, it is the first documented behavioral responses to the Social Security earnings maximum and implies that using the maximum as a policy lever must account for labor supply behavioral responses.
This paper uses multiple payroll tax policy changes to study responsiveness to payroll taxes. By studying only behavior around the kinks, my estimates are only pertinent to those parts of the distribution. If individuals at very high earnings (well above the maximum) do not respond at all to payroll taxes, this method will not uncover that inelasticity.
Furthermore, the policy changes studied in this paper were short-term and individuals may not have had time to respond optimally to the policies or fixed costs may have made such responses sub-optimal in the short-run. I present some evidence that long-term behavior may be different as responsiveness to the MWPTC increased in its second year, possible evidence of the importance of learning. However, given the rarity of payroll tax changes in the United States, these estimates present some of the first natural experiment evidence of responsiveness to payroll taxes. Tables   Table 1: EITC Minimum Income for Maximum Credit by Tax Year   Year:  2008  2009  2010  2011 No children $5, 720 $5, 970 $5, 980 $6, 070 One child $8, 580 $8, 950 $8, 970 $9, 100 Two children $12, 060 $12, 570 $12, 590 $12, 780 Three children $12, 060 $12, 570 $12, 590 $12, 780 The credit rate is 7.65% for households with no children; 34% for household with one child; 40% for household with two children. Beginning in 2009, the the credit rate was 45% for household with three or more children. Significance Levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Each observation is a $400 bin in a year. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions also include bin fixed effects, time fixed effects, and a quadratic term for each year as a function of each bin relative to the kink. "Under Kink" refers to bins with earnings below the kink but within $800 in 2009 and 2010. "Above Kink" refers to bins with earnings above the kink but within $800 in 2009 and 2010. "Joint Significance" refers to a joint hypothesis test that both reported coefficients in the column are equal to 0. "Significance of Sum" refers to a significance test that the sum of the parameters in each column sum to 0. The implied elasticity is the estimate from estimation of specification (3). Significance Levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Each observation is a $400 bin in a year. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions also include bin fixed effects, time fixed effects, and a quadratic term for each year as a function of each bin relative to the kink. "Under Kink" refers to bins with earnings below the kink but within $800. "Above Kink" refers to bins with earnings above the kink but within $800. "Joint Significance" refers to a joint hypothesis test that both reported coefficients in the column are equal to 0. "Significance of Sum" refers to a significance test that the sum of the parameters in each column sum to 0. The implied elasticity is the estimate from estimation of specification (3). Significance Levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Each observation is a $400 bin in a year. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions also include bin fixed effects, time fixed effects, and a quadratic term for each year as a function of each bin relative to the kink. "Under Kink" refers to bins with earnings below the kink but within $800 in 2009 and 2010. "Above Kink" refers to bins with earnings above the kink but within $800 in 2009 and 2010. "Joint Significance" refers to a joint hypothesis test that both reported coefficients in the column are equal to 0. "Significance of Sum" refers to a significance test that the sum of the parameters in each column sum to 0. The implied elasticity is the estimate from estimation of specification (3). Significance Levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Each observation is a $400 bin in a year. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions also include bin fixed effects, time fixed effects, and a quadratic term for each year as a function of each bin relative to the kink. "Under Kink" refers to bins with earnings below the kink but within $800. "Above Kink" refers to bins with earnings above the kink but within $800. "Joint Significance" refers to a joint hypothesis test that both reported coefficients in the column are equal to 0. "Significance of Sum" refers to a significance test that the sum of the parameters in each column sum to 0. The implied elasticity is the estimate from estimation of specification (3). Significance Levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Each observation is a $400 bin in a year. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions also include bin fixed effects, time fixed effects, and a quadratic term for each year as a function of each bin relative to the kink. "Under Kink" refers to bins with earnings below the kink but within $800 in 2011. "Above Kink" refers to bins with earnings above the kink but within $800 in 2011. "Joint Significance" refers to a joint hypothesis test that both reported coefficients in the column are equal to 0. "Significance of Sum" refers to a significance test that the sum of the parameters in each column sum to 0. The implied elasticity is the estimate from estimation of specification (3). Significance Levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. All estimates generated by OLS estimation of log-linear specification. Each observation is a $400 bin in a year. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions also include bin fixed effects, time fixed effects, and a quadratic term for each year as a function of each bin relative to the kink. "Under Kink" refers to bins with earnings below the kink but within $800 in the respective treated years. "Above Kink" refers to bins with earnings above the kink but within $800 in the respective treated years. "Joint Significance" refers to a joint hypothesis test that both reported coefficients in the column are equal to 0. "Significance of Sum" refers to a significance test that the sum of the parameters in each column sum to 0. Significance Levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Each observation is a $400 bin in a year. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Regressions also include bin fixed effects, time fixed effects, and a quadratic term for each year as a function of each bin relative to the kink. "Under Kink" refers to bins with earnings below the kink but within $800 in the respective treated years. "Above Kink" refers to bins with earnings above the kink but within $800 in the respective treated years. "Joint Significance" refers to a joint hypothesis test that both reported coefficients in the column are equal to 0. "Significance of Sum" refers to a significance test that the sum of the parameters in each column sum to 0.
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